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Whither Arbitration? What Can Be Done to Improve
Arbitration and Keep Out Litigation's II Effects
L. Tyrone Holt, Esquire*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is frequently mused that ours is a litigious age; the slightest dis-
pute is a trigger to send persons to court demanding damages. This
aphorism may be true. However, it is also true that a mark of civiliza-
tion is a society that establishes ready and efficient means by which its
citizens may resolve disputes between and among themselves. The
United States of America has established many levels of courts so that
public and private disputes may be resolved efficiently, and the litiga-
tion in those courts creates a just manner by which disputes may be
decided and harms redressed.
In the last half of the Twentieth Century, arbitration has become
prevalent as a means to take many disputes out of the courts. How-
ever, arbitration is under attack by those who seek its benefits, but
abhor its supposed risks and limitations. Parties and their counsel de-
sire a fast, flexible, and binding means of dispute resolution, yet they
cannot release their grip on litigation devices that give them such com-
fort and security-expansive discovery, formal rules of evidence, and
the shining promise of appellate review. Conflicted, they seek a mar-
riage of convenience between arbitration and litigation, the result of
which is "arbigatiorn": a process in which parties use litigation tools to
navigate the arbitral arena.1 This effort compromises arbitration's
goals of effective, fair, and efficient relief.
* I was assisted in the preparation of this paper by my colleagues, Raymond Dean Jones,
Esquire, (Judge Ret.), Daniel J. HiUis, Esquire and Felicia G. Euell, Esquire.
1. It is unclear when the term "arbigation" was coined. It has been in circulation since at least
2003. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in
Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305, 314
(2003) (employing the term "arbigation"). That article does not define "arbigation" in the man-
ner it is used here. Id. (using the term "arbigation" to refer to arbitration in which the litigants
either prefer to fight rather than settle or prefer to settle as late as possible).
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II. IF PERCEPTIONS DICTATE ... (WHY IT IS IMPORTANT
TO ADDRESS CONCERNS ABOUT ARBITRATION
REGARDLESS OF THE EVIDENCE)
Parties, counsel, and scholars alike have criticized arbitration for
becoming too much like litigation.2 Based on anecdotal information,
they perceive arbitration as becoming as costly and time-consuming as
litigation. Although there is limited empirical evidence demonstrating
the cost of arbitration,3 evidence suggests it remains less expensive
than litigation. 4
Still, the perception of arbitral inefficiency is cause for concern. If
parties perceive arbitration as flawed, expensive, and time-consuming,
they are more apt to believe these criticisms and refrain from arbitrat-
ing claims. Unfounded complaints may also give rise to ill-considered
reform initiatives by under-informed business and political forces.
Thus, it is important to address misperceptions and distinguish them
from legitimate concerns. In this way, arbitration can be improved
and, if necessary, changed.
III. ARBITRATION IS AN INVITATION, NOT A
COMMAND PERFORMANCE
5
Despite the presence of an arbitration clause in a contract, parties
spend an enormous amount of time and money arguing about whether
their dispute requires arbitration, how the matter should be arbi-
trated, and how and whether the arbitration award should be enforced
2. See, e.g., Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58 APR Disp.
RESOL. J. 37 (2003) (citing concerns that arbitration is being victimized by "creeping legalism",
"judicialization" and "incremental formalism").
3. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evi-
dence, 41 U.MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 815 (2008) (noting that, as others have commented, "empir-
ical evidence on the cost of arbitration is limited"); cf. Mark Budnitz, The High Cost of
Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 133 (2004) (finding the cost
of mandatory consumer arbitration is often prohibitively high because consumers cannot afford
to prosecute claims or the costs outweigh the benefits).
4. See, e.g., Lisa Brener, Cost and Value of Arbitration, 14 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP.
111, 114 (2003) (finding that firms claimed an average of 32% savings in arbitration, that 45% of
firms' case preparation time in litigation was spent on discovery, and that only 17% of firms'
preparation time in arbitration was spent on discovery).
5. The discussion that follows excludes occasions where arbitration results from "adhesion"
contracts. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal Process of
Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1093 (1999) (discussing unfairness of arbitration in
nonmerchant contexts); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 686-93 (1996) (providing that
corporations' use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts disadvantages consumers).
Adhesion contracts are not addressed in this article and the drafters' comments do not pertain to
those types of contracts or terms.
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once it is issued. These areas deserve attention when considering how
to reduce arbitration costs and keep arbitration free from litigation's
biggest shortcomings because all three factors can lead parties back to
the courts and courthouse practices.
Therefore, a discussion of how to help arbitration avoid the nega-
tive facets of litigation should begin by asking whether a party's needs
are better served by arbitration or litigation. To answer this, parties
and their attorneys need to examine how arbitration and litigation dif-
fer and then tailor contracts to ensure that disputes are heard in the
correct forum. Because arbitration clauses are freely entered into, this
simple act can go a long way toward keeping unwilling participants
from poisoning the arbitral process with litigation antics.
The attorneys who draft agreements and represent parties during
disputes may have little or no arbitration experience. Their knowledge
of dispute resolution may be limited to litigation, and they may as-
sume that arbitration will proceed just as a case would in a trial court.
The parties they represent may have the same limited perspective and
false expectations. Before an arbitration clause is ever inserted into a
contract, counsel must know that their client is aware an agreement to
arbitrate is an almost irrevocable commitment and that the arbitra-
tor's decision is going to be enforced absent very rare circumstances.
If a party recognizes and accepts this before agreeing to an arbitration
clause, there is a higher probability of avoiding challenges to arbi-
trability and the arbitration award.6 Such knowledge of the arbitration
process can save untold sums and years of litigation. In fact, it would
be wise to consider a simple chart which identifies some of the rele-
vant considerations present at different stages of the arbitration
process
6. See AT&T Techs. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (holding that
questions of arbitrability are "undeniably an issue for judicial determination. Unless the parties
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbi-
trate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.") (citations omitted).
2009]
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Issues & Actions
Consider and understand the differences between litigation
and arbitration, and make a determination of the appropriate
dispute resolution procedure to be included in your
agreement. Litigation is formal and provides an array of due
process protections, but can be inefficient, slow, and more
expensive than arbitration. Arbitration is more informal,
flexible, quicker, accessible, specialized, and provides
confidential results. Unlike litigants, arbitrants have great
control when deciding who will decide their dispute. Parties
need to understand an arbitrator's authority, ability to depart
from precedent, informality of evidentiary rules, and
extremely limited appellate rights for arbitration awards.
Parties must decide whether arbitration or litigation best suits
their needs and they should compare different arbitration
laws (FAA, RUAA, etc.) and rules (AAA, IBA, JAMS, etc.)
to ensure proper criteria-based selection. Consider how many
arbitrators to use, whether to have a standard or reasoned
award, and whether to contract for an arbitrated appeal.
Define the dispute(s) to be arbitrated and commit
arbitrability of all issues to the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator(s). Decide which law and rules will govern and
Stage 2: what (if any) procedural rules to apply. Decide availability of
Drafting attorney fees, type of award that is needed, and whether to
contract for an arbitrated appeal. Consider if the parties wish
to impose any limit on the available types of remedies,
damages, or other type of relief that will be available.
Bring dispute to proper venue (avoid risk of being sued for
Stage 3: breach of contract term). Provide clear and concise
Dispute Statement of Claim and Counterclaims (be as complete as
possible to avoid unnecessary amendment).
Accurately gauge the real or likely discovery needs of the
parties and consider the best approach to the type of hearing
preparation that is likely to be needed with a view towards
Stage 4: Pre- avoiding protracted and costly pre-trial activities. Accurately
Hearing assess anticipated length of case based on evidentiary
expectations to avoid scheduling difficulties, continuations,
and expensive postponements. Arbitrator should set tone and
encourage communication throughout dispute. Be creative!
Jointly amend arbitration terms, as needed, to improve
hearing process. Resist litigation impulses (e.g. evidentiary
objections). Stipulate as necessary, bifurcate if sensible, have
Stage 5: experts confer to minimize their disagreements, submit direct
Hearing testimony in writing (to the extent possible), group witnesses
topically to shorten hearing, use joint exhibits in lieu of
witness testimony, and engage in conference calls instead of
hearings when issues arise. Be creative!
Do not seek an attorney fee hearing or call fee experts,
Stage 6: unnecessarily. Before contesting confirmation or filing an
Post-Hearing appeal, consider whether a court has jurisdiction and gauge
likelihood of success. Be aware of possible sanctions.
Stages of
Arbitration
Stage 1:
Education
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Identifying arbitration's parameters helps manage expectations and
encourages solid initial planning. By starting with a sound manage-
ment approach, there is a much better chance that people will be com-
mitted to the arbitration process.
The process of establishing parameters will further improve if liti-
gators adapt to the arbitration process instead of trying to bend it to
their will. As arbitration has grown, the types of attorneys and others
who arbitrate have dramatically changed. Arbitration is no longer a
process engaged in by attorneys who specialize in the field. The ad-
vent of the full service law firm has ushered in a host of lawyers eager
to expand their firm's business. The great majority of these attorneys
are talented and capable litigators. Lamentably, they often have no
arbitration experience and lack the wits of an arbitration advocate.
When they enter the new sphere, they bring the litigation skills that
were the bedrock of their success and their clients' satisfaction. Falling
back on these old skills vexes arbitration by bringing too much adver-
sarial advocacy and too little soul for practical resolution. The parties
and the arbitration process suffer as a consequence. The ability to
maintain a business relationship once the dispute ends can be
threatened by this new style of arbitration. In the bargain, parties are
cheated of one of arbitration's goals-fostering continued commercial
interaction, while timely and practically resolving disputes.
Furthermore, when lawyers retreat to tried and true litigation meth-
ods, arbitrators can get swept along with them. This debases the arbi-
tration process by turning it into pseudo-litigation. Deposition
requests multiply and discovery becomes a full-blown debacle. When
the case is finally concluded, parties are unhappy that the benefits of
arbitration never materialized. The inclination is to blame the arbitra-
tor, but this is often unfair because the arbitrator merely effectuated
the parties' wishes. Indeed, the arbitrator's accession to the parties'
whims may make him or her culpable at least to some extent. Avoid-
ing this scene of discontent is possible if the arbitrator constantly re-
minds the arbitrants of the principles of arbitration, provides strong
and competent leadership, and assists the parties to keep their adver-
sarial actions to a minimum. If the parties' concerted effort seems dif-
ficult to maintain, the arbitrator will have to be that much more
assertive lest the process become a rudderless disaster.
IV. ANY OLD ARBITRATION CLAUSE WON'T Do
(CONSIDER YOUR TERMS)
Once parties evince the desire to participate in the arbitral process,
they must create an agreement defining the issues they are going to
2009]
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arbitrate and give the arbitrator authority to determine all issues of
arbitrability.7 This may require more finesse than simply including an
arbitration clause from a standard form contract. While such clauses
can be perfectly adequate for many situations, a more specific, finely
tuned agreement may sometimes be necessary. It is important for at-
torneys to appropriately draft an agreement based on the subject mat-
ter and the parties' expectations. These may seem like basic
considerations, but the reporters are teeming with opinions concern-
ing omitted terms or poorly defined clauses." The resulting expense
and years of litigation can be cruel lessons to those who intended to
arbitrate. Given the reoccurrence of these issues, parties are wise to
include an attorney fee provision that allows a prevailing party to re-
cover reasonable attorney fees and costs immediately upon resolution
of arbitrability contests rather than at the conclusion of the entire dis-
pute, such as when the arbitration may be included inside of a trial
process. This way, early stage expenses can be immediately recovered
and used to fund the remainder of the case.
Attention must also be paid to which arbitration laws govern, since
subpoena power and subject matter differ dramatically between the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (the "RUAA") and the Federal Ar-
bitration Act (the "FAA"). 9 While the RUAA allows arbitrators to
issue nonparty subpoenas, an arbitrator's authority to issue enforcea-
ble nonparty subpoenas is the subject of a three-way split among the
United States appellate courts. In COMSAT Corp. v. National Science
Foundation, the Fourth Circuit held that courts may enforce arbitral
subpoenas for prehearing proceedings when there is "special need."10
The court reached this conclusion through a nuanced interpretation of
the FAA. 1 However, the court did not define "special need" and the
FAA's text provides no reference. 12
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's opinion, the Eighth Circuit con-
sidered similar issues in Security Life Insurance Co. v. Duncanson &
Holt, Inc.13 The court found that while the "unambiguous text" of § 7
does not explicitly authorize arbitrators to compel nonparties to pro-
7. See LAURENCE CRAIG, RusTY PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION § 9.02 (2000) (discussing how drafting issues can actually increase a
dispute's expense as parties contest whether their contract compels them to arbitrate).
8. See, e.g., Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M, Chicago Graphic Commc'ns Int'l
Union, 20 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1994); N.C. League of Municipalities v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins.
Co., 733 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (E.D.N.C. 1990).
9. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000); 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
10. 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999).
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. 228 F.3d 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 2000)
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duce evidence prior to a hearing, the "interest in efficiency" supports
prehearing document production. 14 Following the Eighth Circuit's de-
cision, the Third Circuit decided Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition
Corp.15 The Third Circuit employed a strict textual reading of the
FAA to hold that arbitrators lack authority to compel nonparties to
produce documents prior to arbitration hearings.1 6
The decisions in COMSAT Corp., Security Life Insurance Co., and
Hay Group, Inc. cannot be reconciled. While the Supreme Court can
resolve the issue, doing so will require it to disregard the strict text of
the FAA or the Court's legitimate efficiency interests.1 7 Since neither
result is satisfactory, legislatures will be left to determine an arbitra-
tor's power to order prehearing discovery from nonparties. While
Congress has yet to act, states have taken measures to ensure arbitra-
tors' authority over nonparties.1 8
For states that have adopted the RUAA, venue is appropriate in
any county where an adverse party resides or has business (barring, of
course, a venue clause in the parties' arbitration agreement). 19 If no
adverse party resides or has a business in the state, relief is appropri-
ately sought in any court in any county within the state.20 Section 10 of
the FAA permits a party to move to vacate an award in the district
court where the award was issued. 21 Venue is determined in accor-
dance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391.22
The issue for those seeking relief in federal court is whether the
court has subject matter jurisdiction via the existence of a federal
question or by way of the court's diversity jurisdiction. 23 Diversity ju-
risdiction exists so long as there is diversity of citizenship and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.24 Whether federal question
jurisdiction exists25 is a more difficult determination due to the split
among the circuits. In Fox v. Faust, the Third Circuit held that a fed-
14. Id. at 871.
15. 360 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2004).
16. Id.
17. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
18. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7309(a) (West 2007).
19. See UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr § 27 (2000).
20. Id.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
22. See Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 195 (2000).
23. See 28 U.S.C. 88 1331, 1332 (2007).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In Mitchell v. Ainbinder, the court held that the "amount in controversy"
is not based on what an arbitrator awards, it is determined according to the damages asserted in
a party's statement of claims. 214 Fed. App'x 565, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2007).
25. The FAA does not create federal question jurisdiction. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008).
2009]
462 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
eral question only exists as to vacatur if there is an independent basis
for jurisdiction on the face of the complaint.26 However, in Greenberg
v. Bear, Stearns & Co., the Second Circuit determined that if a court
were to "look through" the face of a vacatur petition and find that the
underlying dispute involved a federal law, federal question jurisdiction
exists because disposition "necessarily depends on resolution of a sub-
stantial question of federal law."' 27 The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to resolve the circuit split.28 Until the Supreme Court de-
cides this issue, however, subject matter jurisdiction over a vacatur
petition will remain a potential pitfall for those invoking the FAA.
The difference between federal and state statutes in regard to sub-
poena power and subject matter jurisdiction emphasizes the need to
carefully think through and compose arbitration terms. Selecting any
old standard arbitration clause may cause unexpected and unneces-
sary struggle.
V. SOME REASONS WHY ARBITRATION WILL NEVER BECOME
Too MUCH LIKE LITIGATION (AND SOME WAYS PARTIES
CAN REDUCE ARBITRATION COSTS)
Arbitration is a fluid and flexible vehicle for dispute resolution. Its
ability to bring specialized knowledge to bear on any dispute, apply
new technology, offer unparalleled access to a decision-maker, and
provide confidential results are just some of the ways it differs from
litigation. Beyond this, arbitration's status as a party-driven, expert-
led process allows it to be uniquely tailored to provide speedy, cost-
effective variations which are difficult, if not impossible, for courts.
However, unless action is taken to address the trend toward "arbiga-
tion," arbitration may continue to increase in costs, without any corre-
sponding benefits. 29
26. 239 Fed. App'x. 715, 717 (3d Cir. 2007).
27. 220 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2000).
28. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 128 S. Ct. 1651 (2008).
29. From the perspective of a construction industry neutral and advocate, I do not participate
in the process because it promises to always be cheaper. I do so because it offers the opportunity
for faster, fairer, more predictable and precise results in construction industry disputes. I also
believe that if properly managed from the beginning of the process to the end, by experienced
counsel, competent arbitrators, and parties of good will, commercial arbitration has the potential
for consistently producing more cost effective dispute resolution than court accessed commercial
litigation. Further, commercial arbitration can also consistently provide better results, faster de-
cisions and consistently cost effective dispute resolution compared to "arbigation."
[Vol. 7:455
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A. Arbitrator Expertise and Available Technology
Disputes involving technical matters demand specialized knowledge
which historically has led commercial parties to seek arbitration. 30 As
the world grows in complexity, parties continue to seek arbitrators'
expertise to resolve highly technical disputes.31 Whenever a dispute
requires technical knowledge, arbitration will always be superior to
the courts and special masters because arbitrants can choose the
learned individual they want to resolve their dispute. Courts simply
cannot offer this mix of expertise and choice. 32
Additionally, arbitrants can seize technology in ways litigants can-
not.33 Procurement and implementation issues often stymie even basic
technological advancements in large institutions like the judiciary.
Budgetary matters keep litigants from capitalizing on technology. 34 By
contrast, arbitration allows parties to use any new technology the par-
ties own. Moreover, they can create a secure internet site dedicated to
each case. Establishing a private, password-protected site allows par-
ties to submit evidence without suffering photocopying and courier
costs. A case can be fully portable and accessible to any party, attor-
ney, or arbitrator so long as they have a computer and a password.
This reduces costs and promotes faster resolutions.
B. Access and Confidentiality
When parties agree to arbitrate they are, among other things, buy-
ing access to their very own tribunal. This important feature is not
given due consideration when parties complain that arbitration is be-
coming too much like litigation. Whereas courts are open entirely to
30. See Margit Mantica, Arbitrations in Ancient Egypt, 12 ARB. J. 155, 160-61 (1957) (explain-
ing that in arbitrations dating back to 427 A.D., traders sought and accepted the decisions of
fellow traders with expertise on a relevant subject to resolve disputes).
31. See Camille A. Laturno, Comment, International Arbitration of the Creative: A Look at the
World of Intellectual Property Organization's New Arbitration Rules, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW 357,
369-71 (1996) (discussing arbitration as it relates to intellectual property and concluding that
arbitration is especially suited for resolving these technical issues); Richard H. McLaren, The
Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the World's Sports Disputes, 35 VAL.
U. L. REV. 379, 381 (2000) (discussing how the International Olympic Committee established an
arbitration body for resolving sports disputes).
32. This is not to say arbitrators should decide all complicated issues. Matters of great public
concern and social justice are well-served by judicial efforts.
33. While this benefit is equally available to similarly equipped arbitrants, it does create an
issue when parties do not have similar access and use of technology. See Thomas D. Halket, The
Use of Technology in Arbitration: Ensuring the Future is Available to Both Parties, 81 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 269 (2007).
34. See James P. George, Jurisdictional Implications in the Reduced Funding of Lower Federal
Courts, 25 REV. LITIG. 1, 71 (2006) (discussing the adverse impact of inadequate funding on the
availability of courts' access to technology).
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the public, keep standard hours, and are typically closed during week-
ends and holidays, arbitrators set their calendars in conjunction and
cooperation with the parties. This can include any and all of the peri-
ods when a court is closed. Because arbitration is relatively informal,
parties can (subject to ex parte restrictions) call or email an arbitrator
and get immediate answers to their questions. Requests need not be
written, will never be placed on a distant motion calendar, and do not
result in their counsel's appearance at some court's morning cattle call
in a far away county. Since courts are relatively formal and parties
worry about prejudicing their case by pestering judges, small disagree-
ments can accumulate in litigation, worsening the dispute. By contrast,
arbitration's informal nature promotes ready access. This allows par-
ties to get direction, diffuse issues, and keep cases on track.
Moreover, access allows for swift resolutions. Arbitrants can imme-
diately calendar their case and even set the date an award is to be
issued. Once civil litigation begins, assuming a non-aggressive judge,
there is little that can be done to make a court resolve a dispute or to
resolve the matter within a reasonably short period of time. Court-
imposed procedural and discovery rules alone preclude this. Thus, a
matter can sit for weeks, months, and years on a trial court's docket
and then proceed through a similarly paced appeal.
Additionally, an arbitral dispute remains confidential. Parties to ar-
bitrations agree to keep their claims private.35 Generally speaking, ju-
dicial resolutions are matters of public concern and subject to public
disclosure. Accordingly, parties necessarily risk surrendering confi-
dential information whenever they litigate.
C. A Few Words about Discovery
Parties and their counsel seem to tolerate discovery in litigation, but
loathe it in arbitration. The fact is that complicated subjects require a
corresponding depth of analysis, regardless of the type of dispute reso-
lution. Although arbitration is meant to be a streamlined process, it
must not prevent parties from the often time-consuming process of
using tools to unearth information necessary to analyze and resolve
claims. Thus, discovery may be an essential part of some types of arbi-
tration proceedings regardless of how much one may resent its length
and cost. Blindly precluding or excluding some forms of discovery in
35. See N. Sue Van Sant Palmer, Lender Liability and Arbitration: Preserving the Fabric of the
Relationship, 42 VAND. L. REV. 947, 967 (1989) (discussing the privacy component of
arbitration).
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arbitration or litigation may be prejudicial because it impedes full and
fair resolution, and may actually add to the cost of the proceeding.
Recognizing this, it seems baseless to make wholesale criticisms
about discovery's presence in arbitration or raise alarms about how
discovery practices signal creeping litigation. The use of discovery
does not necessarily show that arbitration is becoming too much like
litigation; however, the unnecessary use of discovery may prove that
point exactly. The difficulty, of course, is determining what discovery
is needed for a given case. There is no formula. Each case has its own
requirements.
Anticipating discovery needs is a bit of a gamble when drafting an
arbitration agreement. Importing the broad protection of discovery
rules like the entire Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may give parties
certainty at the time of contracting, but there is a risk that when a
dispute occurs a party may find that the discovery rules are burden-
some. They become a handicap to your client and an advantage to the
opponent. The opponent will have little incentive to relax its procedu-
ral vise-grip, and the arbitrator may have to enforce the agreement's
discovery rules.
To guard against this strategic disadvantage, parties may find their
interests are best served by maintaining flexibility in their discovery
terms. By resisting the impulse to adopt highly constricting terms, par-
ties are likely to be on a more even field when it comes time to deter-
mine what discovery is appropriate. Whatever possible advantage
parties give up at the time of contracting, they make it up by not being
on the wrong side of the fence when the dispute comes to the fore.
Arbitration rules give arbitrators authority to manage discovery.36
Nevertheless, a good arbitrator will be deferential to parties' legiti-
mate discovery needs. The key is to have a reasonable discovery plan
that corresponds with the case's complexity. Like most everything else
in arbitration, the parties can agree to change the terms at any time to
make the process better suit their needs. To avoid disputes in this
area, a thoughtful arbitrator might invite the parties to revisit their
discovery intentions, and amend them if necessary.
D. Determining the Type of Award that is Best for Your Client
As part of managing costs and expectations, parties and their coun-
sel should be aware of the differences between a standard and rea-
soned award. They can then consider what kind of award they want
36. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N INT'L ARBITRATION R. 21 (2007); CONFLIcr PREVENTION &
RESOLUTION R. 11 (2007); JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION R. & P. 17(c) (2007).
20091
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and what they hope to accomplish through its issuance. Too often, no
thought is given to these issues.
A standard award, stating who prevailed and what they won, is cur-
rently the norm in American arbitrations. 37 For relatively simple dis-
putes, a standard award may be adequate. However, since parties'
satisfaction with the arbitral process is often a result of the explana-
tion of the dispute's resolution as opposed to the resolution itself,
standard awards may be insufficient. If a party opts for a reasoned
award, there is a good chance the arbitrator will require that the pro-
ceedings be transcribed. The time necessary for drafting a reasoned
award and the transcription expenses add thousands of dollars to an
arbitration's cost.
To ensure that a reasoned award explicates issues that are essential
to the parties, parties must identify specific issues they want the award
to address. Once these issues are identified, the arbitrator should draft
an award that succinctly sets forth the bases for the decision. A writ-
ten award should be confined to the essential issues, satisfactorily ex-
plained, and limited to the few pages that are necessary for the task.
The arbitrator should not produce an award whose length and detail
reads like a judicial opinion. Exhaustive findings of fact and legal con-
clusions rarely have a place in arbitration. Should the written award
be less for the party's illumination and more to increase the chance of
successfully appealing an adverse decision, the parties should avoid
the expense of a reasoned award. A reasoned award is not apt to spell
out a basis for vacatur. The bases for vacatur are extremely limited
and a competent arbitrator is unlikely to draft an award that provides
such grounds. If parties know this, they may decide to save the ex-
pense of a reasoned award and have their dispute resolved faster and
cheaper with a standard award. Parties need to be counseled so they
can make an informed decision.
E. The More the Merrier? (Choosing the Size of Your Panel)
Selecting a good arbitrator is crucial to high-quality results. Many
times, parties' arbitration agreements will give them the option of
choosing one or a panel of three arbitrators. The conventional wisdom
is to choose a panel of three arbitrators for disputes involving signifi-
cant damages. Parties and counsel comfort themselves by thinking
37. See Drew M. Gulley, The Enhanced Arbitration Appeal Amendment: A Proposal to Save
American Jurisprudence From Arbitration, Modeled on the English Arbitration Act of 1996, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1130 (2008).
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that three arbitrators lessen the chance of an errant decision or a
rogue award.
Despite the logic of opting for a three-member panel, there may be
good reasons to use a single arbitrator. One skilled arbitrator is better
than three incompetent panelists. This is a truism of any arbitration.
Moreover, it is easier to vet one arbitrator's reputation, professional
background, and (if necessary) interview him about his case manage-
ment style and expertise, than it is to engage in this process three
times over. There is also a better chance that parties can efficiently
find one acceptable arbitrator before they find three. The sooner eve-
ryone agrees on the arbitrator, the sooner they can move forward on
resolving the dispute.
Counsel's experience with a three-member arbitration panel may
also serve as a reminder of why less can be more. If you have ever
been bombarded by one panelist's questionable inquiries, ignored by
a second disinterested panelist, and saved by the diligence and skill of
a third panelist, you have probably learned a hard lesson in addition
by subtraction. If parties and counsel trust a single arbitrator they
know to be fair and capable, then it makes sense to use him and forgo
the three-member panel. By doing this, parties can reduce their arbi-
trator costs by two-thirds and speed their dispute to a competent end.
When a single arbitrator presides, attendant benefits include greater
ease of scheduling hearing dates and conferences, faster consensus
about arbitration procedures, and less chance of a divided panel labor-
ing over an award.
VI. LEADING THE WAY (WHAT AN ARBITRATOR CAN Do TO
PROMOTE EFFICIENT ARBITRATIONS)
While the foregoing items discussed ways parties can tailor the arbi-
tration process, there are many instances where an arbitrator in-
creases efficiency by taking initiative and making thoughtful
suggestions.
A. Identify Issues and Entertain Summary Judgment Motions
Judges may be reluctant to identify potentially dispositive issues for
fear of appearing biased. By contrast, arbitrators are encouraged to
reasonably assert themselves by directing parties to focus their
presentations on dispositive issues.38
38. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N INT'L ARBITRATION R. 16; IBA RULES ON THE TAKING
OF Ev. IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PREAMBLE § 3 (1999) ("Each Arbitral Tribunal is
encouraged to identify to the Parties, as soon as it considers it to be appropriate, the issues it
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Some contend arbitrators are unwilling to enter summary judgment
because arbitrators favor full evidentiary hearings.39 Absent any sur-
vey data about arbitrators' attitudes towards summary judgment, it is
impossible to say whether such a contention is justified. Moreover, the
confidential nature of arbitrations makes it unlikely that statistical
data will ever be available. Without knowing the number of summary
judgment motions filed and how many succeed, corroboration is
impossible.
If attorneys have broadly assumed that summary judgment has no
place in arbitrations, this assumption is misplaced. While in arbitration
as in litigation, summary judgment is disfavored unless the absence of
a genuine issue as to material facts can be shown, numerous decisions
show arbitrators' willingness to allow summary judgment.40
As an arbitrator, I find that it is sometimes appropriate to consider
granting dispositive motions on discrete issues or subjects after evi-
dence has been received during the early phases of a long arbitration
hearing. I take this approach with the express approval of the parties,
after giving them an opportunity to present evidence on the issue or
subject that will be available at trial. This gives the parties the oppor-
tunity to fully present all of their evidence, while allowing certain effi-
ciencies to be achieved by shortening the hearing time.
Confirmation of those awards validates the arbitrators' decisions.41
Moreover, there is case law in which parties have agreed to resolve
their dispute by filing cross-motions for summary judgment.42 These
decisions should encourage counsel to submit meritorious summary
judgment motions.
Although summary judgment is a drastic tool which should not be
used unless clearly warranted, both fairness and efficiency support its
may regard as relevant and material to the outcome of the case, including issues where a prelimi-
nary determination may be appropriate.").
39. See, e.g., Christian N. Elloie, Are Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers a Bargain For Employers
Over Arbitration? It Depends on the Employee, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 91, 97 (2009) (alleging that
there is a perceived hostility to summary judgment in employment law cases).
40. See, e.g., Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 1070396, 2009 WL 104666 (Ala. Jan. 9, 2009)
(affirming the entry of summary judgment against the homeowner on a breach of warranty
claim); CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Office of Prof'l Int'l Union Local 39, 443 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir.
2006) (affirming decision where arbitrator entered summary judgment).
41. See, e.g., Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1096 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (upholding an arbitral award that was based on summary adjudications); Marshall &
Co., Inc. v. Duke, 941 F. Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (upholding an arbitral award
analogous to a judgment under Rule 52(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); InterCarbon
Bermuda, Ltd. v. Caldex Trading Corp., 146 F.R.D. 64, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (confirming an arbi-
tral award analogous to summary judgment); Burdette v. FSC Sec. Corp., No. 92-1030, 1993 WL
593997 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1993) (same).
42. See, e.g., CUNA, 443 F.3d at 560.
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use in arbitrations. Arbitrants are not stripped of this valuable proce-
dural mechanism simply because arbitration strives to be fair. It would
be quite unfair to deny a party's valid summary judgment motion sim-
ply because arbitration presumes the admissibility of evidence and fa-
vors full hearings. No procedural rule or norm within arbitration
requires arbitrators to disregard dispositive facts. Once an arbitrator
decides a dispositive issue, the dispute can be significantly narrowed
and savings can be obtained. This is fair, efficient, just, and final.
B. Effective Evidentiary Gate Keeping & Benefits of
Simplified Evidentiary Rules
Arbitrators must allow parties to present their case. This does not,
however, mean an arbitrator must allow the presentation of irrelevant
or cumulative evidence.43 It is a disservice to the parties and the pro-
cess when arbitrators fail to effectively control the presentation of evi-
dence by allowing everything to be admitted "for whatever it is
worth." An arbitrator has a duty to "determine the admissibility, rele-
vance, materiality and weight of the evidence offered by any party. '44
Effectively dealing with cumulative evidence allows the case to pro-
ceed without undue delay.45 Since arbitration is really the parties' pro-
cess, doubts about the relevance or necessity of certain evidence
should be resolved in favor of admissibility. However, an arbitrator
cannot become the conductor on a runaway train. If efforts to advise
counsel about their excesses fail, the high standard necessary for vaca-
tur should steel an arbitrator against receiving inadmissible evidence.
An arbitrator can satisfy his evidentiary responsibilities by commu-
nicating them and consistently administering them. An arbitrator
should confer with counsel once they submit witness lists and identify
the subjects on which the witnesses will testify. By reviewing these
materials as early in the process as possible, arbitrators and counsel
can begin to determine what witnesses and subjects are necessary and
a timeline for their testimony. A frank discussion with counsel about
cumulative and irrelevant witnesses can spur cooperation between
parties, reducing not only cumulative and irrelevant evidence but also
argument about these very things. The entire arbitration process bene-
fits to the extent that disputes are eliminated without parties feeling
that they have been dictated to or deprived. In this vein, an arbitrator
43. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N INT'L ARBITRATION R. 16.3 (providing that arbitrators
may "exclude cumulative or irrelevant testimony or other evidence").
44. Am. ARBITRATION ASS'N INT'L ARBITRATION R. 20.6.
45. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N INT'L ARBITRATION R. 31(b), CONFLICT PREVENTION &
RESOLUTION R. 12 (2007); JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION R. & P. 22(d) (2007).
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should also encourage parties to stipulate to facts as much as possible.
This can certainly focus the dispute and reduce unnecessary evidence
and argument.
Because arbitration is an informal process, arbitrators need not
(and usually do not) strictly apply the rules of evidence. Objections
can be made on significant issues, but counsel should avoid repeated
interruptions that break the pace of the hearings.46 Because evidence
is presumptively admissible, arbitration spares lawyers from authenti-
cating and arguing about every document. Arbitrators who are also
attorneys have training and experience that allows them to recognize
hearsay and other dubious proof. This allows counsel to concentrate
on the case without constantly objecting, seeking sidebars, and making
proffers as they must in litigation.
Failure to object during a trial results in a waiver and an uphill bat-
tle on appeal. Furthermore, once inadmissible evidence enters a ju-
ror's ears, no limiting instruction can ever fully remedy the issue. A
court will direct a jury to disregard a statement, but the presumption
of jurors following a limiting instruction protects a verdict more than
it does the damaged party. An arbitrator's knowledge of the rules of
evidence is far superior protection in the event of inadmissible evi-
dence's utterance. This safeguard allows counsel to focus on present-
ing their case without the expense of ministering to evidentiary rules
or the risk of failing to object.
Additionally, based on the arbitrator's knowledge and skill in pre-
siding, the problems encountered in litigation about taking witnesses
out of order and interrupting one witness to take the testimony of
another out of order, do not occur in arbitration. Where juries might
be confused or even upset by such practices, an arbitrator can be
counted on to parse through the differing testimonies, and keep them
straight. This enables the parties to save time and resources by taking
available witnesses without regard to the order of presentation.
C. Reducing Expert Expenses
The preparation and presentation of expert testimony to a judge
and jury may be an expensive undertaking, with limited or unpredict-
able actual benefits. Experts can command hourly rates as high (or
higher) than counsel. Given the considerable cost of having an expert
testify, every hour that a party does not have to pay for an expert's
services is a significant savings.
46. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N INT'L ARBITRATION R. 31(a); CONFLICT PREVENTION &
RESOLUTION R. 12.2; JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION R. & P. 22(d).
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In litigation, there can be expensive wrangling before an expert says
his first word to a jury. Motions to strike or limit an expert's testimony
routinely lead to hearings where counsel guides his or her expert in a
thorough recitation of the expert's educational background, experi-
ence, and publications. Opposing counsel will then subject the witness
to voir dire, questioning the expert in the hope of disqualification.
When the expert finally takes the stand, parties spend time qualify-
ing their witness via the witness' recitation of his education, publica-
tions, professional affiliations, and other relevant information.
Counsel will then try to discredit the expert by wearing away at every
aspect of the expert's testimony. Many of counsel's questions have lit-
tle to do with the ultimate issue on which the expert will opine, but the
questions and answers are meant to cumulatively show that the ex-
pert's opinion cannot be trusted. Knowing this, the expert will try to
demonstrate the unassailability of his opinion by contesting every
question and issue insinuated by his examiner. Once this is over, coun-
sel for the party who tendered the expert will try to rehabilitate the
expert's opinion by asking more questions. If this was not expensive
enough, the entire process will be repeated when opposing counsel
calls an expert witness.
The 1999 International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evi-
dence in International Commercial Arbitration (the "IBA Rules of
Evidence") offer a means of reducing the length and expense of ex-
pert testimony. Under the IBA Rules of Evidence, an arbitrator can
require experts to meet and discuss their conflicting opinions prior to
testifying.47 The experts-unaccompanied by counsel-prepare a list
of issues on which they cannot agree. As peers, meeting outside the
presence of counsel and away from the tribunal, experts are more
likely to agree on issues that might otherwise vex and complicate a
hearing. By narrowing these disputes, expert testimony becomes more
focused, easily presented, and digestible.
Benefits can further accrue by scheduling experts to testify on the
same day and having them testify back-to-back. Presenting testimony
in this way allows arbitrators to make immediate comparisons and
thus better assess the merits of the experts' testimony. This approach
also advantages counsel by allowing them to address all the experts'
testimony during a single phase of the proceeding. The continuity
avoids the otherwise inevitable multiple review and preparation ses-
47. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF Ev. IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 5, § 3
(1999).
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sions that occur when expert witnesses testify on different days of a
hearing.
D. Written Submission of Direct Testimony
Courts prefer live testimony because it gives judges and juries the
opportunity to weigh a witness' credibility. 48 However, a tightly
scripted direct examination of a well-prepared witness reveals little in
terms of spontaneity or credibility. A witness' veracity is really tested
through cross-examination.
Instead of devoting hours to witness preparation and the presenta-
tion of live testimony on direct examination, counsel could submit a
witness' direct testimony in writing prior to a hearing. 49 Arbitrators
and opposing counsel can review direct testimony and reduce the
number of hours a witness spends at the hearing since, at that point,
the witness need only answer the arbitrator's questions and those
posed via cross and re-direct examination. These questions would al-
low credibility to be appropriately weighed, so the benefits associated
with live testimony would not be lost. There is some expense in writ-
ing a statement of this sort, but the cost can be less than the total
amount of time spent preparing for and then presenting live testi-
mony. The shorter hearing would result in reduced transcription costs,
an added efficiency.
Such a format would be quite workable for many witnesses whose
role in a case is akin to a movie's supporting cast. However, it would
be ill-suited for a "star witness." Live testimony for such witnesses is
essential and should not be denied. Nevertheless, because there are
relatively few "star witnesses" in any proceeding, written testimony
provides much potential for reducing expenses and creating better re-
sults. As a caveat, this procedure should only be used with the under-
standing that a witness whose direct testimony is presented in writing
must appear at the hearing if called. The right to confront a witness
cannot be abridged for efficiency's sake.
Furthermore, while some parties and arbitrators advocate setting
time limits for testimony, those time limits must not prevent the pres-
entation of relevant evidence. Excluding relevant evidence is a basis
for vacatur. Thus, time limits can be set, but they will always be aspira-
tional. Moreover, if live testimony is an absolute must, a witness can
always be presented telephonically or by video without prejudicing a
48. See, e.g., United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the preference
for live testimony).
49. See IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF Ev. IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION arts. 4.7-4.9.
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case. Unlike a jury, an arbitrator will understand the need that gives
rise to something other than live testimony. So long as the right con-
tent is presented, the form will be of little concern.
E. Reducing Expenses through Sequencing of Witnesses
When telling the story of a case, counsel will sequence their wit-
nesses to get the maximum effect from the witnesses' testimony. This
is especially important in a jury trial, when twelve people (possibly
disinterested and likely non-lawyers) are asked to hear and decide a
case. Call witnesses out of sequence in a jury trial and a case is apt to
have a Pulp Fiction-like chronology without any of the equivalent box
office success. 50
In arbitration, educated panelists are interested in hearing the case
and deciding it fairly. This provides significant flexibility in terms of
witness presentation. If a witness' unavailability makes it impossible
to effectively calendar and present a case in a preferred order, a wit-
ness can be taken out of sequence without catastrophic effect. The
arbitrator's experience and knowledge allows them to appreciate the
need and register the testimony's importance regardless of when it is
given. A jury is far less likely to be able to do this.
The flexibility of sequencing witness testimony before a skilled and
knowledgeable arbitrator also allows parties to pair fact witnesses.
Like expert witness pairings, it can be extremely efficient to pair fact
witnesses so that specific subject matter can be heard during a single
phase of the proceeding. The arbitrator is once again afforded the
chance to assess specific issues at one time. Instead of preparing for
the same subject on multiple days, counsel can focus on a subject one
time, avoiding duplicate preparation and review sessions. Such a for-
mat promotes better assessment of the merits, witness credibility, effi-
ciency, and economy.51
F. A Case for Bifurcation?
If a case is lengthy and there is much uncertainty as to liability, it
may be wise to bifurcate the proceedings. The parties can focus on
establishing liability and present only the witnesses and other evi-
dence that proves that part of their case. For that matter, it may be
useful to structure the hearing so that the parties will present their
50. As viewers will recall, the movie Pulp Fiction used a non-chronological narrative format
and dark humor to achieve great commercial and critical success. See PULP FICTION (Miramax
1994).
51. See IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF Ev. IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 8.1.
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claims and defenses on one issue (e.g., a copyright claim) during one
part of the liability phase before moving onto some disparate claim
(e.g., a fraud claim). Since the issues and witnesses may not overlap, it
may make sense to arrange hearing days according to topic. A certain
number of days can be scheduled for the liability phase of the hearing
with the understanding that the arbitrator may then entertain and rule
on something akin to a motion for directed verdict.
If liability is established, the parties proceed to the damages phase
of the hearing. At that time, the parties can call the fact witnesses,
accountants, or any other experts necessary to show the amount of
their harm. Under the right circumstances, this approach does not
amount to needless separation or invite unnecessary motions. How-
ever, its benefits depend on the nature of a case, and a properly struc-
tured and efficiently followed process.
G. Consider Issuing an Interim Award
Once an arbitrator issues a final award, the award can only be modi-
fied to address clerical, typographical, or computational errors. 52
Modification is appropriate when: (1) the award is incomplete and/or
ambiguous; (2) the court resubmits an issue to the arbitrator; (3) a
mistake is apparent from the face of the award; or (4) the parties re-
quest to resubmit an issue to the arbitrator.5 3 If an error in a final
award does not fit within one of these categories, parties are probably
stuck with it. This is very disconcerting when, for instance, a reasoned
award makes no mention of an important issue or fails to make a key
finding of fact. Because the arbitrator loses jurisdiction over the case
once a final award is issued and the scope of review for that award is
so narrow, an aggrieved party may have no means of getting relief.54
For that matter, an error may affect all the arbitrants with everyone
wishing to alter the award.
To avoid such a scenario, the parties can request (or an arbitrator
issue separately) an interim award. American Arbitration Association
("AAA") Rule 46 allows arbitrators to issue interim awards "in addi-
tion to the final award" and arbitrators have authority to substantially
52. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. & MEDIATION P. 46-47
(2007).
53. See Red Star Express Lines v. Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 170, 809 F.2d 103, 106-08 (1st Cir.
1987).
54. See Michael Cavendish, Fortress Arbitration (An Exposition of Functus Officio "). 80 FLA.
B.J. 20 (2006) (explaining the intended limitations via the doctrine of functus officio-literally "a
task performed"-but noting judicial hostility and numerous exceptions to the ancient rule).
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modify interim awards.55 By issuing an interim award, the parties re-
ceive an opportunity to review the award for any errors before the
award becomes final. If an error is something other than clerical, typo-
graphical, or computational, it can be brought to the arbitrator's at-
tention and the arbitrator can modify the award before it becomes
final. The procedural ease of such a method is compelling. Moreover,
it helps ensure a correct award and eliminates costly confirmation
contests and appeals.
H. Resist Attorney Fee Hearings and Require a Good Brief Instead
A prevailing party is often inclined to request a hearing to argue in
support of the fees and costs accrued because of the arbitration. The
losing party will want to argue that the fees and costs should not be
awarded or should be reduced for whatever reason. This expensive
practice is common, but it is often unnecessary.
Since the arbitrator just presided over the hearing, saw counsel's
efforts, and determined the merits of the case, there is probably no
need to have a hearing devoted to attorney fees and costs. Live testi-
mony or argument will serve little purpose given that the arbitrator
has had the chance throughout the hearing to weigh credibility. Thus,
the parties' arguments should be confined to written submissions. If
the parties desire an explanation of fees and costs, they should include
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the arbitrator's
consideration. In doing so, they increase the chance of having the de-
sired award issued. Furthermore-and this cannot be emphasized
enough-it is rarely necessary for counsel (despite their irresistible
urge) to present the expert testimony of an attorney to justify fees and
costs. An experienced arbitrator has the requisite knowledge to de-
cide fees and costs without expert testimony.
VII. APPEALING AN ARBITRATION AWARD
With all the hard work that goes into a case and all that is lost once
a final award is issued, attorneys and parties naturally want to have
another chance to show why they should win. Before giving into the
urge to file an appeal, it is wise to gain some critical distance, consult
the law, and reconsider the burning desire before sanctions are at
issue.
55. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. & MEDIATION P. 46. See, e.g.,
BFN-Greeley, LLC v. Adair Group, Inc., 141 P.3d 937 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (arbitrators had
authority under the AAA rules to issue an interim award which included an escrow provision
and then deleted that provision in a final award).
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A. Valid Bases for Vacating Arbitration Awards
The standard of review for an arbitrator's award is perhaps the nar-
rowest type of review. As the Seventh Circuit once stated, "Judicial
review of arbitration awards is tightly limited; perhaps it should not be
called 'review' at all."'56 In response to the extraordinarily limited
standard of review, parties have attempted to enlarge courts' author-
ity to review awards for errors beyond those specified in arbitration
statutes.5 7 In Hall Street Associates, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated such efforts by holding that the grounds listed in the FAA,
9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and 11, are the exclusive grounds available for review-
ing an arbitration award. 58
The Hall Street Associates decision was limited to FAA procedures
and it emphasized that parties could seek review under state statutes
and common law59 where a different scope of review is arguable.60
However, common law procedures for vacatur have been largely en-
gulfed by the FAA, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the RUAA. 61
56. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). In Baravati,
Judge Posner defended the relative loss of due process by commenting that this loss is acceptable
because the parties accept arbitration's procedures when they contract for arbitrated resolutions.
Id. at 709.
57. For example, the Federal Arbitration Act provides four statutory grounds for vacating an
arbitration award: (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2)
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; and (4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2007).
58. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1401-02 (2008).
59. This does not exclude arguments based on public policy. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized a narrow public policy exception that allows a reviewing court to refuse to enforce arbitra-
tion awards that contravene "explicit public policy." W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l
Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). The "public policy, must be well
defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents
and not from general considerations of supposed public interests."' Id. (quoting Muschany v.
United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). Successful application of the public policy exception is
rare, but it does exist. See Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987). In Iowa Electric, the court declined to enforce an
arbitration award that would have reinstated the job of a union member at a nuclear power plant
after he was fired for violating regulations for containing radiation in the event of a disaster. Id.
at 1427. This was a "strong public policy" violation that required the court to refuse enforcement
of the arbitration award. Id. at 1427-28. Nonetheless, most attempts to invalidate an award based
on public policy fail. See, e.g., Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775 (11th Cir.
1993) (finding vacatur unwarranted when broker's failure to register in accordance with law was
not willful, as violative of public policy and award did not compel action which contravened
public policy).
60. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C., 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 cmt. e (1981).
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Moreover, since the Supreme Court acted, some state courts began to
immediately abandon traditional extra-statutory bases for reviewing
arbitration awards. 62 Given the strong preference for enforcing arbi-
tration and courts' burgeoning dockets, extra-statutory review may
become a trend. This would make parties' attempts to contract for
more expansive judicial review meaningless.
The prospect of such a limited scope of review leads some parties to
conclude that arbitration is too risky. They are concerned that they
will be saddled with a rogue award and have little ability to contest it.
Rogue awards are, by definition, infrequent.63 This rarity makes rogue
awards a dubious basis for criticizing or foregoing the arbitral process.
When a rogue award occurs, it is unfortunate for the parties and the
process alike. However, there is little reason to believe that a rogue
award is any more likely in arbitration than it is in litigation. Judges
and juries are every bit as capable of a rogue award as an arbitrator.
Still, if parties need some manner of protecting themselves against this
risk, they can contract for a second round of arbitration as their mech-
anism for an appeal. 64 A post-award process of "appellate" arbitrators
could review an award before a final award is issued. This would in-
crease an arbitration's expense and duration, but it would also provide
62. See, e.g., Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 1070396, 2009 WL 104666 (Ala. Jan. 9, 2009)
(exercising the state court's concurrent jurisdiction under the FAA, but citing Hall Street Associ-
ates to find that manifest disregard of the law is no longer a valid basis to modify an arbitrator's
award under the FAA). Not all states have followed Hall Street Associates. See, e.g., Cable Con-
nection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334 (Cal. 2008) (declining to follow Hall Street
Associates decision on state law grounds).
63. In my experience, a "rogue award" is one that is grossly inappropriate given the factual or
legal underpinnings of a particular case.
64. As a further means of risk-shifting, some critics have called for the imposition of arbitrator
liability to give arbitrants another avenue of relief. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator
Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279 (2000) (arguing for
arbitrator liability). Although the RUAA has an unwaivable provision barring arbitrator liability
for conduct taken in the course of an arbitration, the premise of arbitrator liability warrants
comment.
In essence, arbitrator liability is an attempt to balkanize a party's risk by foisting potential
harm onto another entity and creating a new avenue for recovery. What the concerned party
gains in this regard may be offset by the cost of a new dispute, the uncertain prospects of the new
claim, and the lack of finality sought when their arbitration originally began.
Allowing arbitrator liability is not a panacea for the potential ill of arbitrator malfeasance.
With potential liability looming over every decision, an arbitrator's decisiveness would be badly
impacted. Every scheduling issue, discovery matter, evidentiary ruling, and order could turn into
ground for a disaffected party to seek financial recovery. The arbitral process would be slowed
and additional disputes would be spawned from effort to resolve the existing one. Similar consid-
erations led to the implementation of broad immunity for judges and court personnel long ago.
Those considerations are unshakable support for a continuing policy of arbitral immunity. This is
to say nothing of higher fees that arbitrators would command to pay insurance for potential
claims.
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the review some parties desire. The speed of such an appeal would
likely be much greater than anything that could be had in civil
litigation.
B. You Can Appeal, But Do You Have a Non-Frivolous Basis?
If a party elects to appeal an arbitrator's award, counsel must con-
sider whether there is a non-frivolous basis for the appeal. There is
"clear and emphatic" precedent that directs courts "to uphold sanc-
tions in a broad spectrum of arbitration cases. The 'filing of meritless
suits and appeals' in arbitration cases warrants Rule 11 sanctions. '65
In the Seventh Circuit case of CUNA Mutual Insurance Society v.
Office of Professional International Union Local 39, the parties agreed
to resolve a dispute about a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the
"CBA") by having the arbitrator rule on cross-motions for summary
judgment.66 After the arbitrator decided CUNA's outsourcing vio-
lated the CBA, CUNA moved the district court to vacate that part of
the arbitration award.67 CUNA also argued that the arbitrator erred
by retaining jurisdiction to address damages issues.68 The Union recip-
rocated by moving the district court to sanction CUNA under Rule
11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the vacatur ef-
fort was frivolous. 69 The district court obliged, awarding the Union
$9,132.50 in attorneys' fees.70
On appeal, CUNA abandoned any argument about the arbitrator's
ability to retain jurisdiction.71 Instead, CUNA contended that sanc-
tions were inappropriate because its vacatur effort was not a challenge
to the award, but an argument about whether the outsourcing was an
arbitrable issue. 72 Since questions of arbitrability are always issues for
judicial determination (absent the parties' clear agreement to the con-
65. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Office of Prof'l Int'l Union Local 39, 443 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir.
2006).
66. Id. at 560.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 564.
69. Id. at 559-60. Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows courts to impose
sanctions on a party if the requirements stated in Rule 11(b) are not satisfied. Rule 11(b)(2)
requires that "the claims and defenses, and other legal contentions [of filings] are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing
law or the establishment of new law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
70. CUNA, 443 F.3d at 561.
71. Id. at 562.
72. Id. at 562-63.
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trary), CUNA cagily contended that its vacatur motion was
nonfrivolous. 73
The Seventh Circuit, like the district court, immediately saw
through CUNA's argument. It found that "there was not a true ques-
tion of arbitrability in this case. Instead CUNA 'dresses up its argu-
ments about the scope of the arbitrator's authority in arbitrability
clothing.' 74 As for CUNA's abandoned argument about the arbitra-
tor's ability to retain jurisdiction to resolve any controversy regarding
the implementation of the arbitral award, the Seventh Circuit held
that "[tlhe case law on this issue is clear, and that CUNA's counsel
'should have known that [its] position is groundless.' ' 175 The court
stated that "[tlhe fact that CUNA's lawyers did not discuss this claim
in its appellate brief suggests they knew this argument was flawed.
The aborted claim further justifies the district court's decision to apply
Rule 11 sanctions to CUNA. ''76 Thus, the court affirmed the
sanctions. 77
In B.L. Harbert International LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., the Elev-
enth Circuit was on the cusp of sua sponte sanctioning a party for a
frivolous appeal, but decided instead to use the opinion to put every
attorney who appears before it on notice.7 8
The notice [the opinion] provides, hopefully to even the least astute
reader, is that this Court is exasperated by those who attempt to
salvage arbitration losses through litigation that has no sound basis
in the law applicable to arbitration awards. The warning this opin-
ion provides is that in order to further the purposes of the FAA and
to protect arbitration as a remedy we are ready, willing, and able to
consider imposing sanctions in appropriate cases. 79
The Cuna and Harbert opinions serve as stern warnings to any arbi-
trant that courts will not tolerate disgruntled parties' baseless appeals.
Regardless of what an attorney calls a client's motion, Cuna provides
that Rule 11 sanctions are in play if the motion is essentially a frivo-
lous attempt to contest an award. The Harbert opinion is even more
foreboding in that it broadly announces an entire circuit's willingness
73. Id. (holding that questions of arbitrability are issues for judicial determination unless par-
ties have agreed otherwise) (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 563 (citing Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Office of Prof'l Int'l Union Local 39, No. 04-C-
138-C, 2004 WL 2713088, at *6 (W.D.Wis. Nov. 29, 2004)).
75. CUNA, 443 F.3d at 565 (citing Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731,
990 F.2d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 1993) (additional citation omitted).
76. Id. at 565.
77. Id.
78. 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006) (overruled as to manifest disregard by Hall Street Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008)).
79. Id. at 914.
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to issue sanctions sua sponte. Counsel and parties alike need to take
heed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unnecessary litigation and hardball antics can best be avoided when
parties and counsel are willing participants in the arbitration process.
While litigation devices such as extensive discovery will be necessary
in complicated cases, the arbitral process need not and should not be
overtaken by courthouse conduct. Litigators would do well to stop
leaning on old familiar ways when they arbitrate cases. Embracing ar-
bitration's creativity and efficiency will encourage change, but exper-
ienced arbitrators and counsel must commit to help lead the way.
Inasmuch as attorneys cannot castigate arbitration for drafting defects
and the nasty litigation practices attorneys cause, arbitrators cannot
be complicit by allowing deleterious litigation practices to erode arbi-
tration's interests. Ensuring an effective arbitration process is the re-
sponsibility of all. With a steadfast commitment, the "holy grail" of
making arbitration consistently better, cheaper, and faster can be
achieved.
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